Securing the Objectivity of Relative Facts in the Quantum World

TL;DR

This paper compares relational quantum mechanics and a pragmatist view, highlighting issues of objectivity in relative facts and showing recent improvements in RQM that align it more closely with scientific objectivity.

Contribution

It identifies key differences in how RQM and DP treat relative facts and demonstrates recent modifications to RQM that enhance its scientific objectivity.

Findings

RQM's original ontology of relative facts conflicts with scientific objectivity.

DP's relative facts maintain objectivity suitable for scientific knowledge.

Recent RQM modifications address previous objections, aligning it with DP.

Abstract

This paper compares and contrasts relational quantum mechanics (RQM) with a pragmatist view of quantum theory (DP). I'll first explain important points of agreement. Then I'll point to two problems faced by RQM and sketch DP's solutions to analogous problems. Since both RQM and DP have taken the Born rule to require relative facts I next say what these might be. This brings me to my main objection to RQM as originally conceived -- that its ontology of relative facts is incompatible with scientific objectivity and undercuts the evidential base of quantum theory. In contrast DP's relative facts have all the objectivity we need to accept quantum theory as scientific knowledge. But a very recent modification to RQM has successfully addressed my main objection, bringing the two views into even closer alignment.