Byzantine Agreement with Optimal Resilience via Statistical Fraud Detection

TL;DR

This paper presents a new asynchronous Byzantine Agreement protocol that achieves optimal resilience of less than one-third of corrupt parties with polynomial expected latency, using statistical fraud detection to handle adaptive adversaries.

Contribution

It introduces a novel collective coin-flipping protocol combined with statistical fraud detection, enabling optimal resilience with polynomial latency in asynchronous Byzantine Agreement.

Findings

Achieves Byzantine Agreement with optimal resilience f<n/3.

Ensures polynomial expected latency with high probability.

Utilizes statistical fraud detection to identify and mitigate Byzantine influence.

Abstract

Since the mid-1980s it has been known that Byzantine Agreement can be solved with probability 1 asynchronously, even against an omniscient, computationally unbounded adversary that can adaptively \emph{corrupt} up to $f<n/3$ parties. Moreover, the problem is insoluble with $f\geq n/3$ corruptions. However, Bracha's 1984 protocol achieved $f<n/3$ resilience at the cost of exponential expected latency $2^{\Theta(n)}$, a bound that has never been improved in this model with $f=\lfloor (n-1)/3 \rfloor$ corruptions. In this paper we prove that Byzantine Agreement in the asynchronous, full information model can be solved with probability 1 against an adaptive adversary that can corrupt $f<n/3$ parties, while incurring only polynomial latency with high probability. Our protocol follows earlier polynomial latency protocols of King and Saia and Huang, Pettie, and Zhu, which had suboptimal resilience, namely $f \approx n/10^9$ and $f<n/4$, respectively. Resilience $f=(n-1)/3$ is uniquely difficult as this is the point at which the influence of the Byzantine and honest players are of roughly equal strength. The core technical problem we solve is to design a collective coin-flipping protocol that eventually lets us flip a coin with an unambiguous outcome. In the beginning the influence of the Byzantine players is too powerful to overcome and they can essentially fix the coin's behavior at will. We guarantee that after just a polynomial number of executions of the coin-flipping protocol, either (a) the Byzantine players fail to fix the behavior of the coin (thereby ending the game) or (b) we can ``blacklist'' players such that the blacklisting rate for Byzantine players is at least as large as the blacklisting rate for good players. The blacklisting criterion is based on a simple statistical test of fraud detection.