Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus
Joshua S. Gans, Richard Holden

TL;DR
This paper proposes simple, mechanism-based approaches to blockchain consensus that leverage staking and truthful validation, aiming to improve robustness, scalability, and attack resistance in distributed networks.
Contribution
It introduces novel revelation mechanisms for blockchain consensus using proof-of-stake, addressing issues of forks and attacks with simple, robust protocols.
Findings
Mechanisms ensure truthful block proposals in proof-of-stake systems.
Protocols are operationally and computationally simple.
Approaches enhance robustness and scalability of blockchain consensus.
Abstract
Blockchain consensus is a state whereby each node in a network agrees on the current state of the blockchain. Existing protocols achieve consensus via a contest or voting procedure to select one node as a dictator to propose new blocks. However, this procedure can still lead to potential attacks that make consensus harder to achieve or lead to coordination issues if multiple, competing chains (i.e., forks) are created with the potential that an untruthful fork might be selected. We explore the potential for mechanisms to be used to achieve consensus that are triggered when there is a dispute impeding consensus. Using the feature that nodes stake tokens in proof of stake (POS) protocols, we construct revelation mechanisms in which the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium involves validating nodes propose truthful blocks using only the information that exists amongst all nodes. We…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsBlockchain Technology Applications and Security · Distributed systems and fault tolerance · Auction Theory and Applications
