Adversarial Scrutiny of Evidentiary Statistical Software
Rediet Abebe, Moritz Hardt, Angela Jin, John Miller, Ludwig Schmidt,, Rebecca Wexler

TL;DR
This paper introduces a robust adversarial testing framework for scrutinizing the validity of evidentiary statistical software used in the U.S. criminal justice system, aiming to enhance defense capabilities and safeguard rights.
Contribution
It proposes a standardized adversarial auditing method for statistical software in legal cases, adapting robust machine learning techniques for defense use.
Findings
Framework standardizes scrutiny process
Empowers defense to test software validity
Discusses systemic barriers and policy solutions
Abstract
The U.S. criminal legal system increasingly relies on software output to convict and incarcerate people. In a large number of cases each year, the government makes these consequential decisions based on evidence from statistical software -- such as probabilistic genotyping, environmental audio detection, and toolmark analysis tools -- that defense counsel cannot fully cross-examine or scrutinize. This undermines the commitments of the adversarial criminal legal system, which relies on the defense's ability to probe and test the prosecution's case to safeguard individual rights. Responding to this need to adversarially scrutinize output from such software, we propose robust adversarial testing as an audit framework to examine the validity of evidentiary statistical software. We define and operationalize this notion of robust adversarial testing for defense use by drawing on a large…
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Taxonomy
MethodsTest
