Efficacy of Asynchronous GPS Spoofing Against High Volume Consumer GNSS Receivers

TL;DR

This paper investigates the effectiveness of asynchronous GPS spoofing attacks on high-volume consumer GNSS receivers and drones, revealing vulnerabilities and providing new insights into attack strategies and defenses.

Contribution

It designs and tests an asynchronous GPS spoofing attack plan against consumer GNSS devices and drones, offering novel insights into attack effectiveness and vulnerabilities.

Findings

Asynchronous spoofing can effectively disrupt consumer GNSS devices.

Drones are vulnerable to spoofing under various conditions.

The study provides new insights into attack success factors.

Abstract

The vulnerability of the Global Positioning System (GPS) against spoofing is known for quite some time. Also, the positioning and navigation of most semi-autonomous and autonomous drones are dependent on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals. In prior work, simplistic or asynchronous GPS spoofing was found to be a simple, efficient, and effective cyber attack against L1 GPS or GNSS dependent commercial drones. In this paper, first we make some important observations on asynchronous GPS spoofing attacks on drones presented in prior research literature. Then, we design an asynchronous GPS spoofing attack plan. Next, we test the effectiveness of this attack against GNSS receivers (high volume consumer devices based on Android mobile phones) of different capabilities and a commercial drone (DJI Mavic 2 Pro) under various conditions. Finally, we present several novel insights based on the results of the tests.