On head-to-head results as tie-breaker and consequent opportunities for collusion
L\'aszl\'o Csat\'o

TL;DR
This paper analyzes how head-to-head tie-breaker rules in football tournaments can create collusion opportunities, increasing the risk of match-fixing and suggesting alternative tie-breaking methods to mitigate this risk.
Contribution
It provides a mathematical characterization of collusion opportunities caused by head-to-head tie-breakers and quantifies the increased risk through simulations based on a major tournament.
Findings
Head-to-head tie-breakers increase collusion risk by 11.5-14.8 percentage points.
Static scheduling cannot effectively mitigate collusion risk.
Using goal difference as the primary tie-breaker reduces collusion opportunities.
Abstract
The outcome of some football matches has benefited both teams at the expense of a third team because head-to-head results were used for breaking ties. Inspired by these examples, our mathematical analysis identifies all possible collusion opportunities caused by this particular ranking rule in a single round-robin tournament with four teams. According to a simulation model based on the 2024 UEFA European Football Championship, merely the tie-breaking rule increases the probability of reaching a situation vulnerable to collusion by between 11.5 and 14.8 percentage points. This risk can scarcely be mitigated by a static match schedule. Therefore, tournament organisers are strongly encouraged to choose goal difference as the primary tie-breaking rule, similar to the official policy of FIFA.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSports Analytics and Performance · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Sports, Gender, and Society
