ASAP: Reconciling Asynchronous Real-Time Operations and Proofs of Execution in Simple Embedded Systems
Adam Caulfield, Norrathep Rattanavipanon, Ivan De Oliveira Nunes

TL;DR
This paper introduces ASAP, an architecture that enables secure asynchronous processing and proof of execution in low-end embedded systems, addressing real-time and security needs simultaneously.
Contribution
It presents a novel architecture that allows asynchronous PoX in low-end MCUs, improving security and real-time capabilities with minimal hardware overhead.
Findings
ASAP supports asynchronous PoX in low-end MCUs.
ASAP is secure under full software compromise.
ASAP incurs less hardware overhead than previous schemes.
Abstract
Embedded devices are increasingly ubiquitous and their importance is hard to overestimate. While they often support safety-critical functions (e.g., in medical devices and sensor-alarm combinations), they are usually implemented under strict cost/energy budgets, using low-end microcontroller units (MCUs) that lack sophisticated security mechanisms. Motivated by this issue, recent work developed architectures capable of generating Proofs of Execution (PoX) for the correct/expected software in potentially compromised low-end MCUs. In practice, this capability can be leveraged to provide "integrity from birth" to sensor data, by binding the sensed results/outputs to an unforgeable cryptographic proof of execution of the expected sensing process. Despite this significant progress, current PoX schemes for low-end MCUs ignore the real-time needs of many applications. In particular, security…
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Taxonomy
TopicsReal-Time Systems Scheduling · Distributed systems and fault tolerance · Security and Verification in Computing
