Only what exists can cause: An intrinsic view of free will
Giulio Tononi, Larissa Albantakis, Melanie Boly, Chiara Cirelli,, Christof Koch

TL;DR
This paper explores how integrated information theory (IIT) implies that free will is compatible with physical causality, asserting that conscious entities are true causes of their actions based on intrinsic existence.
Contribution
It presents an intrinsic view of free will grounded in IIT, proposing that consciousness and cause-effect power are essential for genuine causation and responsibility.
Findings
IIT links consciousness to cause-effect power in the brain.
Consciousness as intrinsic existence enables true causation.
Free will is compatible with physical causality under IIT.
Abstract
This essay addresses the implications of integrated information theory (IIT) for free will. IIT is a theory of what consciousness is and what it takes to have it. According to IIT, the presence of consciousness is accounted for by a maximum of cause-effect power in the brain. Moreover, the way specific experiences feel is accounted for by how that cause-effect power is structured. If IIT is right, we do have free will in the fundamental sense: we have true alternatives, we make true decisions, and we - not our neurons or atoms - are the true cause of our willed actions and bear true responsibility for them. IIT's argument for true free will hinges on the proper understanding of consciousness as true existence, as captured by its intrinsic powers ontology: what truly exists, in physical terms, are intrinsic entities, and only what truly exists can cause.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophy and Theoretical Science · Free Will and Agency · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
