Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations
Sarah Dean, Jamie Morgenstern

TL;DR
This paper investigates how personalized content recommendations influence user preferences over time, showing that certain algorithms can maintain preference stability and exploring the conditions needed for such stationarity.
Contribution
It introduces a model of preference dynamics under personalization, demonstrating how to design recommendation algorithms that achieve preference stationarity and how to learn user preferences for this purpose.
Findings
Standard reward maximization often yields constant regret in this environment.
It is possible to design recommendation strategies that maintain preference stationarity.
Algorithms can learn user preferences to implement stable recommendation strategies.
Abstract
Many projects (both practical and academic) have designed algorithms to match users to content they will enjoy under the assumption that user's preferences and opinions do not change with the content they see. Evidence suggests that individuals' preferences are directly shaped by what content they see -- radicalization, rabbit holes, polarization, and boredom are all example phenomena of preferences affected by content. Polarization in particular can occur even in ecosystems with "mass media," where no personalization takes place, as recently explored in a natural model of preference dynamics by~\citet{hkazla2019geometric} and~\citet{gaitonde2021polarization}. If all users' preferences are drawn towards content they already like, or are repelled from content they already dislike, uniform consumption of media leads to a population of heterogeneous preferences converging towards only two…
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Taxonomy
TopicsOpinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Game Theory and Applications
