Social network heterogeneity benefits individuals at the expense of groups in the creation of innovation
Fatemeh Zarei, Jan Ryckebusch, Koen Schoors, Luis E C Rocha

TL;DR
This paper models how social network heterogeneity influences innovation, showing it fosters individual technological complexity but can hinder overall group innovation, with effects modulated by collaboration openness and interdisciplinarity.
Contribution
It introduces an evolutionary mechanistic model linking social network structure and innovation, revealing contrasting effects of heterogeneity at individual and group levels.
Findings
Social heterogeneity enhances individual technological complexity.
Heterogeneity reduces overall group innovation capacity.
Interdisciplinary interactions increase technological complexity and inequality.
Abstract
Innovation is fundamental for development and provides a competitive advantage for societies. It is the process of creating more complex technologies, ideas, or protocols from existing ones. While innovation may be created by single agents (i.e. individuals or organisations), it is often a result of social interactions between agents exchanging and combining complementary expertise and perspectives. The structure of social networks impacts this knowledge exchange process. To study the role of social network structures on the creation of new technologies, we design an evolutionary mechanistic model combining self-creation and social learning. We find that social heterogeneity allows agents to leverage the benefits of diversity and to develop technologies of higher complexity. Social heterogeneity, however, reduces the group ability to innovate. Not only the social structure but also the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Evolution and Genetic Dynamics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
