A possibilistic no-go theorem on the Wigner's friend paradox

TL;DR

This paper presents a possibilistic no-go theorem related to the Wigner's friend paradox, challenging assumptions about observed events and interventions in quantum mechanics without relying on probability theory.

Contribution

It introduces a probability-free, possibilistic version of the Local Friendliness theorem using modal logic, weakening the assumptions needed for the no-go result.

Findings

A possibilistic no-go theorem is established for the Wigner's friend paradox.

The theorem relies on a weaker assumption called 'Possibilistic Local Agency'.

It demonstrates contradictions under these assumptions without using probability theory.

Abstract

In a recent work, Bong et al. [Nature Physics 16, 1199 (2020)] proved a no-go theorem demonstrating a contradiction between a set of assumptions called "Local Friendliness" (LF) and certain quantum phenomena on an extended version of the "Wigner's friend" paradox. The LF assumptions can be understood as the conjunction of two independent assumptions: Absoluteness of Observed Events (AOE) requires that events observed by any observer have absolute, rather than relative, values; Local Agency (LA) encodes the assumption that an intervention cannot influence events outside its future light cone. The proof of the LF no-go theorem, however, implicitly assumes the validity of standard probability theory. Here we present a probability-free version of the Local Friendliness theorem, building upon Hardy's no-go theorem for local hidden variables. The argument is phrased in the language of possibilities, which we make formal by using a modal logical approach. It relies on a weaker version of Local Agency, which we call "Possibilistic Local Agency": the assumption that an intervention cannot influence the possibilities of events outside its future light cone.