Lotteries for Shared Experiences
Nick Arnosti, Carlos Bonet

TL;DR
This paper analyzes lottery mechanisms for allocating tickets to groups for shared experiences, evaluating their efficiency and fairness, and proposing modifications to improve outcomes in different settings.
Contribution
It introduces and compares the Group Lottery, Individual Lottery, and Weighted Individual Lottery mechanisms, providing bounds and modifications for better fairness and efficiency.
Findings
Group Lottery has tight bounds on inefficiency and unfairness.
Weighted Individual Lottery reduces unfairness and improves efficiency.
Mechanism modifications make lotteries more fair and efficient in practice.
Abstract
We study a setting where tickets for an experience are allocated by lottery. Each agent belongs to a group, and a group is successful if and only if its members receive enough tickets for everyone. A lottery is efficient if it maximizes the number of agents in successful groups, and fair if it gives every group the same chance of success. We study the efficiency and fairness of existing approaches, and propose practical alternatives. If agents must identify the members of their group, a natural solution is the Group Lottery, which orders groups uniformly at random and processes them sequentially. We provide tight bounds on the inefficiency and unfairness of this mechanism, and describe modifications that obtain a fairer allocation. If agents may request multiple tickets without identifying members of their group, the most common mechanism is the Individual Lottery, which orders…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
