Addressing Strategic Manipulation Disparities in Fair Classification
Vijay Keswani, L. Elisa Celis

TL;DR
This paper investigates how fairness constraints in classification can fail to reduce disparities in strategic manipulation costs across groups and proposes a new constrained optimization framework to address this issue.
Contribution
It introduces a novel framework that explicitly reduces strategic manipulation cost disparities, improving fairness in strategic classification settings.
Findings
Standard fairness constraints do not reduce strategic cost disparities.
The proposed framework lowers manipulation costs for minority groups.
Empirical results demonstrate improved fairness on real-world datasets.
Abstract
In real-world classification settings, such as loan application evaluation or content moderation on online platforms, individuals respond to classifier predictions by strategically updating their features to increase their likelihood of receiving a particular (positive) decision (at a certain cost). Yet, when different demographic groups have different feature distributions or pay different update costs, prior work has shown that individuals from minority groups often pay a higher cost to update their features. Fair classification aims to address such classifier performance disparities by constraining the classifiers to satisfy statistical fairness properties. However, we show that standard fairness constraints do not guarantee that the constrained classifier reduces the disparity in strategic manipulation cost. To address such biases in strategic settings and provide equal…
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Taxonomy
TopicsExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Corruption and Economic Development
