Fair Allocation of Indivisible Chores: Beyond Additive Costs
Bo Li, Fangxiao Wang, Yu Zhou

TL;DR
This paper investigates fair allocation of indivisible chores with complex cost functions, establishing tight bounds for submodular and subadditive costs, and exploring specific cases like bin packing and job scheduling.
Contribution
It proves new impossibility and approximation bounds for MMS fairness beyond additive costs, and shows constant approximations exist for certain subadditive cost scenarios.
Findings
No algorithm can guarantee better than (n, log m / log log m)-approximation for submodular costs.
Existence of (n, log m)-approximate allocations for subadditive costs, tight asymptotically.
Constant approximate allocations exist for bin packing and job scheduling problems.
Abstract
We study the maximin share (MMS) fair allocation of indivisible chores to agents who have costs for completing the assigned chores. It is known that exact MMS fairness cannot be guaranteed, and so far the best-known approximation for additive cost functions is by Huang and Segal-Halevi [EC, 2023]; however, beyond additivity, very little is known. In this work, we first prove that no algorithm can ensure better than -approximation if the cost functions are submodular. This result also shows a sharp contrast with the allocation of goods where constant approximations exist as shown by Barman and Krishnamurthy [TEAC, 2020] and Ghodsi et al. [AIJ, 2022]. We then prove that for subadditive costs, there always exists an allocation that is -approximation, and thus the approximation ratio is…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
