Public Signals in Network Congestion Games
Svenja M. Griesbach, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm, Tim Koglin

TL;DR
This paper explores how a benevolent mobility service can use traffic information to influence congestion in networks, showing that in many cases, optimal signaling strategies can be computed efficiently, especially in simple network structures.
Contribution
The paper characterizes when full information revelation is optimal and provides polynomial-time algorithms for computing optimal signaling in specific network classes.
Findings
Full information revelation is optimal in certain single-commodity networks.
Optimal signaling can be computed efficiently for two states.
Polynomial-time algorithms are extended to multi-commodity parallel link networks with few commodities.
Abstract
We consider a largely untapped potential for the improvement of traffic networks that is rooted in the inherent uncertainty of travel times. Travel times are subject to stochastic uncertainty resulting from various parameters such as weather condition, occurrences of road works, or traffic accidents. Large mobility services have an informational advantage over single network users as they are able to learn traffic conditions from data. A benevolent mobility service may use this informational advantage in order to steer the traffic equilibrium into a favorable direction. The resulting optimization problem is a task commonly referred to as signaling or Bayesian persuasion. Previous work has shown that the underlying signaling problem can be NP-hard to approximate within any non-trivial bounds, even for affine cost functions with stochastic offsets. In contrast, we show that in this case,…
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Taxonomy
TopicsTransportation Planning and Optimization · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Game Theory and Applications
