Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ridesharing Networks
J. Massey Cashore, Peter I. Frazier, Eva Tardos

TL;DR
This paper introduces a stochastic spatiotemporal pricing mechanism for ridesharing networks that ensures robust, welfare-maximizing equilibria despite market uncertainties and complex dynamics.
Contribution
It develops a novel two-level stochastic model and a dynamic pricing mechanism that guarantees incentive compatibility and welfare optimality in large, uncertain markets.
Findings
The SSP mechanism is asymptotically incentive-compatible.
All approximate equilibria of SSP are asymptotically welfare-maximizing.
Dynamic pricing ensures robustness against stochastic shocks.
Abstract
Ridesharing markets are complex: drivers are strategic, rider demand and driver availability are stochastic, and complex city-scale phenomena like weather induce large scale correlation across space and time. At the same time, past work has focused on a subset of these challenges. We propose a model of ridesharing networks with strategic drivers, spatiotemporal dynamics, and stochasticity. Supporting both computational tractability and better modeling flexibility than classical fluid limits, we use a two-level stochastic model that allows correlated shocks caused by weather or large public events. Using this model, we propose a novel pricing mechanism: stochastic spatiotemporal pricing (SSP). We show that the SSP mechanism is asymptotically incentive-compatible and that all (approximate) equilibria of the resulting game are asymptotically welfare-maximizing when the market is large…
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Taxonomy
TopicsTransportation and Mobility Innovations · Sharing Economy and Platforms · Urban Transport and Accessibility
