Time-dependent effects hinder cooperation on the public goods game

TL;DR

This paper investigates how time-dependent factors like productivity oscillations and punishment delays negatively impact cooperation in the public goods game, revealing that such dynamics hinder cooperative behavior.

Contribution

It introduces the analysis of time-dependent effects, such as oscillations and delays, on cooperation in the public goods game, which has not been extensively studied before.

Findings

Oscillations in productivity reduce cooperation.

Punishment delays also hinder cooperative behavior.

Both effects concur to diminish cooperation.

Abstract

The public goods game is a model of a society investing some assets and regaining a profit, although can also model biological populations. In the classic public goods game only two strategies compete: either cooperate or defect; a third strategy is often implemented to asses punishment, which is a mechanism to promote cooperation. The conditions of the game can be of a dynamical nature, therefore we study time-dependent effects such an as oscillation in the enhancement factor, which accounts for productivity changes over time. Furthermore, we continue to study time dependencies on the game with a delay on the punishment time. We conclude that both the oscillations on the productivity and the punishment delay concur in the detriment of cooperation.