Sample-Efficient Learning of Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
Ziang Song, Song Mei, Yu Bai

TL;DR
This paper introduces the first sample-efficient algorithm for learning Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibria (EFCE) in imperfect-information games using bandit feedback, by generalizing to $K$-EFCE and designing an uncoupled no-regret learning approach.
Contribution
It proposes a novel $K$-EFCE framework and develops the first sample-efficient bandit feedback algorithm for learning EFCE in extensive-form games.
Findings
Achieves $ ilde{O}(rac{ ext{max}_i X_i A_i^{K+1}}{ ext{epsilon}^2})$ sample complexity.
Introduces a generalized $K$-EFCE concept encompassing EFCE at $K=1$.
Provides an uncoupled no-regret algorithm for $K$-EFCE.
Abstract
Imperfect-Information Extensive-Form Games (IIEFGs) is a prevalent model for real-world games involving imperfect information and sequential plays. The Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as a natural solution concept for multi-player general-sum IIEFGs. However, existing algorithms for finding an EFCE require full feedback from the game, and it remains open how to efficiently learn the EFCE in the more challenging bandit feedback setting where the game can only be learned by observations from repeated playing. This paper presents the first sample-efficient algorithm for learning the EFCE from bandit feedback. We begin by proposing -EFCE -- a more generalized definition that allows players to observe and deviate from the recommended actions for times. The -EFCE includes the EFCE as a special case at , and is an increasingly stricter notion of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
