Causal Estimation of Position Bias in Recommender Systems Using Marketplace Instruments
Rina Friedberg, Karthik Rajkumar, Jialiang Mao, Qian Yao, YinYin Yu,, Min Liu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel method leveraging existing A/B tests as instrumental variables to accurately estimate position bias in recommender systems, addressing unobserved confounding and improving relevance measurement.
Contribution
It proposes a new instrumental variable approach using historical A/B tests to estimate position bias, overcoming limitations of previous methods like propensity scores and regression discontinuity.
Findings
Robust position bias estimates obtained in LinkedIn applications
Method handles unobserved confounding effectively
Applicable to various information retrieval systems
Abstract
Information retrieval systems, such as online marketplaces, news feeds, and search engines, are ubiquitous in today's digital society. They facilitate information discovery by ranking retrieved items on predicted relevance, i.e. likelihood of interaction (click, share) between users and items. Typically modeled using past interactions, such rankings have a major drawback: interaction depends on the attention items receive. A highly-relevant item placed outside a user's attention could receive little interaction. This discrepancy between observed interaction and true relevance is termed the position bias. Position bias degrades relevance estimation and when it compounds over time, it can silo users into false relevant items, causing marketplace inefficiencies. Position bias may be identified with randomized experiments, but such an approach can be prohibitive in cost and feasibility.…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Bandit Algorithms Research · Recommender Systems and Techniques · Game Theory and Voting Systems
