Continuous-variable quantum key distribution: security analysis with trusted hardware noise against general attacks

TL;DR

This paper presents a security proof for continuous-variable quantum key distribution that accounts for hardware noise, demonstrating system robustness against various attacks in realistic scenarios.

Contribution

It provides a composable security analysis for CV-QKD considering trusted hardware noise, extending previous models to more practical implementations.

Findings

Operability at 10.2 dB loss with collective attacks

Operability at 7.5 dB loss with coherent attacks

Security proof applicable to realistic CV-QKD systems

Abstract

In this paper, using the full security framework for continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), we provide a composable security proof for the CV-QKD system in a realistic implementation. We take into account equipment losses and contributions from various components of excess noise and evaluate performance against collective and coherent attacks assuming trusted hardware noise. The calculation showed that the system remains operable at channel losses up to 10.2 dB in the presence of collective attacks and up to 7.5 dB in the presence of coherent ones.