A counter example to the theorems of social preference transitivity and social choice set existence under the majority rule
Fujun Hou

TL;DR
This paper presents a counterexample showing that existing theorems on social preference transitivity and social choice set existence under majority rule are not universally valid, challenging current assumptions in social choice theory.
Contribution
It provides a specific example that violates the conditions required by established theorems, highlighting gaps in the current theoretical framework.
Findings
Counterexample invalidates some social choice theorems
Existing conditions are not exhaustive or necessary
Challenges current assumptions in social preference theory
Abstract
I present an example in which the individuals' preferences are strict orderings, and under the majority rule, a transitive social ordering can be obtained and thus a non-empty choice set can also be obtained. However, the individuals' preferences in that example do not satisfy any conditions (restrictions) of which at least one is required by Inada (1969) for social preference transitivity under the majority rule. Moreover, the considered individuals' preferences satisfy none of the conditions of value restriction (VR), extremal restriction (ER) or limited agreement (LA), some of which is required by Sen and Pattanaik (1969) for the existence of a non-empty social choice set. Therefore, the example is an exception to a number of theorems of social preference transitivity and social choice set existence under the majority rule. This observation indicates that the collection of the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications
