Voting in Two-Crossing Elections
Andrei Constantinescu, Roger Wattenhofer

TL;DR
This paper introduces two-crossing elections as a generalization of single-crossing elections, providing polynomial recognition algorithms, complexity results, and efficient algorithms for certain voting rules, highlighting differences in computational complexity.
Contribution
It establishes polynomial-time recognition for two-crossing elections, explores their properties, and analyzes the complexity of voting rules within this framework, contrasting with single-crossing elections.
Findings
Two-crossing elections can be recognized in polynomial time.
Many voting rules are NP-hard under two-crossing elections.
Young scores and Chamberlin-Courant rule can be computed efficiently in two-crossing elections.
Abstract
We introduce two-crossing elections as a generalization of single-crossing elections, showing a number of new results. First, we show that two-crossing elections can be recognized in polynomial time, by reduction to the well-studied consecutive ones problem. We also conjecture that recognizing -crossing elections is NP-complete in general, providing evidence by relating to a problem similar to consecutive ones proven to be hard in the literature. Single-crossing elections exhibit a transitive majority relation, from which many important results follow. On the other hand, we show that the classical Debord-McGarvey theorem can still be proven two-crossing, implying that any weighted majority tournament is inducible by a two-crossing election. This shows that many voting rules are NP-hard under two-crossing elections, including Kemeny and Slater. This is in contrast to the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Electoral Systems and Political Participation
