Blending Data and Physics Against False Data Injection Attack: An Event-Triggered Moving Target Defence Approach
Wangkun Xu, Martin Higgins, Jianhong Wang, Imad M. Jaimoukha, and Fei Teng

TL;DR
This paper proposes a novel approach that combines data-driven detection with physics-based moving target defenses to improve false data injection attack detection in power systems, reducing false positives and defense costs.
Contribution
It introduces a physics-informed data-driven attack detection algorithm and an MTD protocol optimized via bilevel programming, enhancing detection accuracy and stealthiness.
Findings
High detection rate achieved
False positive rate reduced
MTD costs minimized
Abstract
Fast and accurate detection of cyberattacks is a key element for a cyber-resilient power system. Recently, data-driven detectors and physics-based Moving Target Defences (MTD) have been proposed to detect false data injection (FDI) attacks on state estimation. However, the uncontrollable false positive rate of the data-driven detector and the extra cost of frequent MTD usage limit their wide applications. Few works have explored the overlap between these two areas. To fill this gap, this paper proposes blending data-driven and physics-based approaches to enhance the detection performance. To start, a physics-informed data-driven attack detection and identification algorithm is proposed. Then, an MTD protocol is triggered by the positive alarm from the data-driven detector. The MTD is formulated as a bilevel optimisation to robustly guarantee its effectiveness against the worst-case…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Code & Models
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsSmart Grid Security and Resilience · Network Security and Intrusion Detection · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
