Mixed Strategies for Security Games with General Defending Requirements
Rufan Bai, Haoxing Lin, Xinyu Yang, Xiaowei Wu, Minming Li, Weijia Jia

TL;DR
This paper explores mixed strategies in security games with targets having different defending requirements, establishing NP-hardness for optimal solutions and proposing an efficient approximation algorithm with practical effectiveness.
Contribution
It introduces the first study of mixed strategies for security games with non-uniform defending requirements and develops a close-to-optimal algorithm for such complex scenarios.
Findings
NP-hardness of computing optimal mixed strategies with general defending requirements
Proposed an efficient Patching algorithm for near-optimal mixed strategies
Experimental validation on large real-world datasets shows effectiveness
Abstract
The Stackelberg security game is played between a defender and an attacker, where the defender needs to allocate a limited amount of resources to multiple targets in order to minimize the loss due to adversarial attack by the attacker. While allowing targets to have different values, classic settings often assume uniform requirements to defend the targets. This enables existing results that study mixed strategies (randomized allocation algorithms) to adopt a compact representation of the mixed strategies. In this work, we initiate the study of mixed strategies for the security games in which the targets can have different defending requirements. In contrast to the case of uniform defending requirement, for which an optimal mixed strategy can be computed efficiently, we show that computing the optimal mixed strategy is NP-hard for the general defending requirements setting. However, we…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInfrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
