Can Voters Detect Errors on Their Printed Ballots? Absolutely
Philip Kortum, Michael D. Byrne, Chidera O. Azubike, Laura E. Roty

TL;DR
This study demonstrates that voters can nearly perfectly detect errors on their printed ballots after voting on a BMD, highlighting the importance of encouraging ballot review for election integrity.
Contribution
It provides empirical evidence that voters are highly capable of detecting ballot errors, supporting policies that promote ballot verification.
Findings
Overall accuracy of error detection was 99.8%
Detection performance was robust across ballot length and type
Voters can reliably identify ballot alterations with proper guidance
Abstract
There is still debate on whether voters can detect malicious changes in their printed ballot after making their selections on a Ballot Marking Device (BMD). In this study, we altered votes on a voter's ballot after they had made their selections on a BMD. We then required them to examine their ballots for any changes from the slate they used to vote. Overall accuracy was exceptionally high. Participants saw 1440 total contests, and of those 1440, there were a total of 4 errors, so total accuracy was 99.8%. Participants were able to perform with near-perfect accuracy regardless of ballot length, ballot type, number of altered races, and location of altered races. Detection performance was extremely robust. We conclude that with proper direction and resources, voters can be near-perfect detectors of ballot changes on printed paper ballots after voting with a BMD. This finding has…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Privacy, Security, and Data Protection · Hate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection
