On Scheduling Mechanisms Beyond the Worst Case
Yansong Gao, Jie Zhang

TL;DR
This paper analyzes two scheduling mechanisms beyond worst-case scenarios, showing that one outperforms the other pointwise and both have constant average-case approximation ratios under certain probabilistic models.
Contribution
It demonstrates that mechanism K is pointwise better than mechanism P and establishes tight average-case approximation ratios for both mechanisms under i.i.d. cost distributions.
Findings
Mechanism K outperforms mechanism P on all inputs.
Average-case approximation ratios for both mechanisms converge to a constant.
The bounds improve upon previous single-task setting results.
Abstract
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines has been studied since the inception of algorithmic mechanism design \cite{NR99}. It is a resource allocation problem that entails assigning tasks to machines for execution. Machines are regarded as strategic agents who may lie about their execution costs so as to minimize their allocated workload. To address the situation when monetary payment is not an option to compensate the machines' costs, \citeauthor{DBLP:journals/mst/Koutsoupias14} [2014] devised two \textit{truthful} mechanisms, K and P respectively, that achieve an approximation ratio of and , for social cost minimization. In addition, no truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than . Hence, mechanism K is optimal. While approximation ratio provides a strong worst-case guarantee, it also limits us to a comprehensive…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Optimization and Search Problems · Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research
