Making Markets for Information Security: The Role of Online Platforms in Bug Bounty Programs

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how online platforms like HackerOne facilitate bug bounty programs by reducing transaction costs and information asymmetries, thereby creating a market for cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

Contribution

It provides an empirical analysis of HackerOne's platform, highlighting its role in organizing bug bounty programs and shaping the cybersecurity market.

Findings

Platforms reduce information asymmetries.

Bug bounty programs incentivize vulnerability reporting.

HackerOne connects firms and researchers effectively.

Abstract

Security is an essential cornerstone of functioning digital marketplaces and communities. If users doubt that data shared online will remain secure, they will withdraw from platforms. Even when firms take these risks seriously, security expertise is expensive and vulnerabilities are diverse in nature. Increasingly, firms and governments are turning to bug bounty programs (BBPs) to crowdsource their cybersecurity, in which they pay individuals for reporting vulnerabilities in their systems. And while the use of BBPs has grown significantly in recent years, research on the actors in this market and their incentives remains limited. Using the lens of transaction cost economics, this paper examines the incentives of firms and researchers (sometimes called hackers) participating in BBPs. We study the crucial role that centralized platforms that organize BBPs play in this emerging market. We carry out an analysis of the HackerOne BBP platform, using a novel dataset on over 14,000 researchers reporting over 125,000 public vulnerabilities to over 500 firms from 2014 to the end of 2021. We outline how platforms like HackerOne make a market for information security vulnerabilities by reducing information asymmetries and their associated transaction costs.