A Rotating Proposer Mechanism for Team Formation
Jian Low, Chen Hajaj, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
TL;DR
This paper introduces a rotating proposer mechanism for team formation that guarantees Pareto efficiency and equilibrium stability in strategic team-building scenarios.
Contribution
It proposes a novel rotating proposer mechanism that achieves Pareto efficiency and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in team formation games.
Findings
Mechanism guarantees Pareto efficiency.
Ensures subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Applicable to strategic team formation scenarios.
Abstract
We present a rotating proposer mechanism for team formation, which implements a Pareto efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of an extensive-form team formation game.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models