The Parking Problem: A Game-Theoretic Solution
Giuseppe Calise, Aniello Murano, Silvia Stranieri

TL;DR
This paper introduces a game-theoretic approach to optimize multi-agent parking assignments, modeling cars as agents in a game to find Nash equilibrium solutions efficiently, demonstrated through a hospital parking case study.
Contribution
It presents a novel game-theoretic framework and a quadratic-time algorithm for multi-agent parking optimization, with practical implementation and testing.
Findings
Efficient quadratic-time algorithm for parking assignment
Successful application to hospital parking scenario
Evidence of improved parking allocation through game-theoretic method
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic solution to the parking problem, by exploiting a strategic-reasoning approach for multi-agent systems. Precisely, cars are modeled by agents interacting among them in a multi-player game setting, whose aim is to get a free slot parking-place satisfying their own constraints. The overall assignment is then given as a Nash equilibrium solution. We come up with an algorithm (and its implementation in a tool) that works in quadratic time. We give evidence of the benefits of our approach by running our tool on a large hospital parking space.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSmart Parking Systems Research · Auction Theory and Applications · Transportation and Mobility Innovations
