Strategyproof and Proportional Chore Division for Piecewise Uniform Preferences

TL;DR

This paper introduces a strategyproof and proportional algorithm for dividing chores fairly among multiple players with piecewise uniform preferences, ensuring no player benefits from misrepresenting their valuations.

Contribution

It presents the first algorithm that guarantees both strategyproofness and proportionality for chore division with any number of players and piecewise uniform valuations.

Findings

Algorithm achieves strategyproof and proportional division

Works for any number of players

Applicable to piecewise uniform preferences

Abstract

Chore division is the problem of fairly dividing some divisible, undesirable bad, such as a set of chores, among a number of players. Each player has their own valuation of the chores, and must be satisfied they did not receive more than their fair share. In this paper, I consider the problem of strategyproof chore division, in which the algorithm must ensure that each player cannot benefit from mis-representing their position. I present an algorithm that performs proportional and strategyproof chore division for any number of players given piecewise uniform valuation functions.