Sensor Deception Attacks Against Initial-State Privacy in Supervisory Control Systems
Jingshi Yao, Xiang Yin, Shaoyuan Li

TL;DR
This paper develops a method to synthesize sensor deception attacks that can compromise initial-state privacy in supervisory control systems of discrete-event systems, highlighting vulnerabilities and attack strategies.
Contribution
It introduces the All Attack Structure (AAS) for synthesizing sensor attack strategies and simplifies the process by exploiting the privacy requirement structure.
Findings
AAS effectively synthesizes sensor attack strategies.
Sensor attacks can violate initial-state opacity.
Structural properties reduce synthesis complexity.
Abstract
This paper investigates the problem of synthesizing sensor deception attackers against privacy in the context of supervisory control of discrete-event systems (DES). We consider a DES plant controlled by a supervisor, which is subject to sensor deception attacks. Specifically, we consider an active attacker that can tamper with the observations received by the supervisor by, e.g., hacking on the communication channel between the sensors and the supervisor. The privacy requirement of the supervisory control system is to maintain initial-state opacity, i.e., it does not want to reveal the fact that it was initiated from a secret state during its operation. On the other hand, the attacker aims to deceive the supervisor, by tampering with its observations, such that initial-state opacity is violated due to incorrect control actions. In this work, we investigate from the attacker's point of…
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Taxonomy
TopicsSecurity and Verification in Computing · Distributed systems and fault tolerance · Petri Nets in System Modeling
