Social adaptive behavior and oscillatory prevalence in an epidemic model on evolving random geometric graphs
Akhil Panicker, V Sasidevan

TL;DR
This paper explores how spatial factors and adaptive behaviors influence epidemic spread on evolving random geometric graphs, revealing oscillatory prevalence patterns and emphasizing early intervention strategies.
Contribution
It introduces a model combining spatial mobility, interpersonal distance, and adaptive responses to study epidemic dynamics, highlighting oscillations and the impact of delays.
Findings
Spatial and adaptive behaviors induce oscillatory epidemic prevalence.
Early adaptive strategies reduce peak prevalence and oscillations.
Delays in response amplify oscillations and nonlinear effects.
Abstract
Our recent experience with the COVID-19 pandemic amply shows that spatial effects like the mobility of agents and average interpersonal distance, together with the adaptation of agents, are very important in deciding the outcome of epidemic dynamics. Structural and dynamical aspects of random geometric graphs are widely employed in describing processes with a spatial dependence, such as the spread of an airborne disease. In this work, we investigate the interplay between spatial factors, such as agent mobility and average interpersonal distance, and the adaptive responses of individuals to an ongoing epidemic within the framework of random geometric graphs. We show that such spatial factors, together with the adaptive behavior of the agents in response to the prevailing level of global epidemic, can give rise to oscillatory prevalence even with the classical SIR framework. We…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCOVID-19 epidemiological studies · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
