The Block-based Mobile PDE Systems Are Not Secure -- Experimental Attacks
Niusen Chen, Bo Chen, Weisong Shi

TL;DR
This paper experimentally demonstrates that block-layer mobile PDE systems are vulnerable to attacks that can compromise deniability by accessing raw NAND flash, highlighting security flaws in current implementations.
Contribution
The work provides the first experimental validation of deniability compromises in block-layer mobile PDE systems using a custom testbed and disk forensics.
Findings
Block-layer PDE systems can be compromised via raw NAND flash access.
Experimental validation confirms deniability breaches in practice.
Potential real-world attack issues are discussed.
Abstract
Nowadays, mobile devices have been used broadly to store and process sensitive data. To ensure confidentiality of the sensitive data, Full Disk Encryption (FDE) is often integrated in mainstream mobile operating systems like Android and iOS. FDE however cannot defend against coercive attacks in which the adversary can force the device owner to disclose the decryption key. To combat the coercive attacks, Plausibly Deniable Encryption (PDE) is leveraged to plausibly deny the very existence of sensitive data. However, most of the existing PDE systems for mobile devices are deployed at the block layer and suffer from deniability compromises. Having observed that none of existing works in the literature have experimentally demonstrated the aforementioned compromises, our work bridges this gap by experimentally confirming the deniability compromises of the block-layer mobile PDE systems. We…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Data Storage Technologies · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques · Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption
