
TL;DR
This paper investigates how much a player can artificially inflate their Elo rating by rigging games with a limited budget, revealing a phase transition at a specific number of players and providing bounds for various scenarios.
Contribution
It provides the first asymptotic bounds on maximum Elo ratings achievable through game rigging with a given budget, including a phase transition phenomenon.
Findings
For two players, the maximum rating is determined up to a constant error.
A phase transition occurs at n=k^{1/3}, drastically increasing the maximum rating.
For n > k^{1/3}, the maximum Elo rating scales at least as Θ(k^{1/3}).
Abstract
Elo rating systems measure the approximate skill of each competitor in a game or sport. A competitor's rating increases when they win and decreases when they lose. Increasing one's rating can be difficult work; one must hone their skills and consistently beat the competition. Alternatively, with enough money you can rig the outcome of games to boost your rating. This paper poses a natural question for Elo rating systems: say you manage to get together people (including yourself) and acquire enough money to rig games. How high can you get your rating, asymptotically in ? In this setting, the people you gathered aren't very interested in the game, and will only play if you pay them to. This paper resolves the question for up to constant additive error, and provide close upper and lower bounds for all other , including for growing arbitrarily with . There is a…
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