
TL;DR
This paper introduces a new post-quantum digital signature protocol using Winternitz chains and HORS oracle, enabling secure, repudiation-proof signing for mutually mistrustful parties with a large number of signatures per key.
Contribution
It presents a novel bipartite signature scheme based on Winternitz chains and HORS, with security features suitable for post-quantum cryptography.
Findings
Supports a large number of signatures per public key
Ensures non-repudiation within the security model
Discusses security parameters and potential applications
Abstract
This paper proposes and evaluates a new bipartite post-quantum digital signature protocol based on Winternitz chains and the HORS oracle. Mutually mistrustful Alice and Bob are able to agree and sign a series of documents in a way that makes it impossible (within the assumed security model) to repudiate their signatures. The number of signatures supported by a single public key is limited by a large number but the security of the signature scheme is not diminished by repeated application. A single public key supports both parties. Some ramifications are discussed, security parameters evaluated and an application area delineated for the proposed concept.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsCryptographic Implementations and Security · Chaos-based Image/Signal Encryption · Cryptography and Data Security
