Disassortative mixing of boundedly-rational players in socio-ecological systems

TL;DR

This paper investigates how disassortative mixing of bounded rationality among players in socio-ecological networks enhances overall system rationality, with implications for optimizing strategic interactions.

Contribution

It reveals that disassortative mixing of node rationality maximizes system rationality, a novel insight into the role of scalar-assortativity in socio-ecological networks.

Findings

Disassortative mixing increases system rationality.

Placement of high-rationality nodes is less critical.

Simulation results support the effectiveness of disassortativity.

Abstract

Bounded rationality refers to the non-optimal rationality of players in non-cooperative games. In a networked game, the bounded rationality of players may be heterogeneous and spatially distributed. It has been shown that the `system rationality', which indicates the overall rationality of a network of players, may play a key role in the emergence of scale-free or core-periphery topologies in real-world networks. On the other hand, scalar-assortativity is a metric used to quantify the assortative mixing of nodes with respect to a given scalar attribute. In this work, we observe the effect of node rationality-based scalar-assortativity, on the system rationality of a network. Based on simulation results, we show that irrespective of the placement of nodes with higher rationality, it is the disassortative mixing of node rationality that helps to maximize system rationality in a population. The findings may have useful interpretations and applications in socio-economic systems in maximizing the utility of interactions in a population of strategic players.