Tiramisu: Layering Consensus Protocols for Scalable and Secure Blockchains

TL;DR

This paper introduces Tiramisu, a layered blockchain protocol framework that combines permissioned and permissionless protocols, offering scalable and secure decentralized cryptocurrencies with a comprehensive game-theoretic analysis.

Contribution

It generalizes layered blockchain protocols and provides a framework for analyzing their security in realistic settings using the BAR Model and game theory.

Findings

Identifies key parameters for secure operation in realistic environments

Provides a generalized game-theoretic analysis of layered protocols

Highlights limitations of honest majority assumptions in existing protocols

Abstract

Cryptocurrencies are poised to revolutionize the modern economy by democratizing commerce. These currencies operate on top of blockchain-based distributed ledgers. Existing permissionless blockchain-based protocols offer unparalleled benefits like decentralization, anonymity, and transparency. However, these protocols suffer in performance which hinders their widespread adoption. In particular, high time-to-finality and low transaction rates keep them from replacing centralized payment systems such as the Visa network. Permissioned blockchain protocols offer attractive performance guarantees, but they are not considered suitable for deploying decentralized cryptocurrencies due to their centralized nature. Researchers have developed several multi-layered blockchain protocols that combine both permissioned and permissionless blockchain protocols to achieve high performance along with decentralization. The key idea with existing layered blockchain protocols in literature is to divide blockchain operations into two layers and use different types of blockchain protocols to manage each layer. However, many such works come with the assumptions of honest majority which may not accurately reflect the real world where the participants may be self-interested or rational. These assumptions may render the protocols susceptible to security threats in the real world, as highlighted by the literature focused on exploring game-theoretic attacks on these protocols. We generalize the "layered" approach taken by existing protocols in the literature and present a framework to analyze the system in the BAR Model and provide a generalized game-theoretic analysis of such protocols. Using our analysis, we identify the critical system parameters required for a distributed ledger's secure operation in a more realistic setting.