A Wearables-Driven Attack on Examination Proctoring

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates a novel, highly effective attack on multiple choice exams using wearable sensors and haptic feedback, exposing vulnerabilities in current proctoring methods and advocating for banning all tech gadgets during exams.

Contribution

It introduces a new wearable-based attack protocol on exam integrity, combining experimental validation and theoretical modeling to highlight security flaws.

Findings

The attack is highly effective in bypassing current proctoring measures.

Wearable sensors can be exploited to covertly transmit answers during exams.

Current proctoring methods are insufficient against advanced sensor-based attacks.

Abstract

Multiple choice questions are at the heart of many standardized tests and examinations at academic institutions allover the world. In this paper, we argue that recent advancements in sensing and human-computer interaction expose these types of questions to highly effective attacks that today's proctor's are simply not equipped to detect. We design one such attack based on a protocol of carefully orchestrated wrist movements combined with haptic and visual feedback mechanisms designed for stealthiness. The attack is done through collaboration between a knowledgeable student (i.e., a mercenary) and a weak student (i.e., the beneficiary) who depends on the mercenary for solutions. Through a combination of experiments and theoretical modeling, we show the attack to be highly effective. The paper makes the case for an outright ban on all tech gadgets inside examination rooms, irrespective of whether their usage appears benign to the plain eye.