Two-Stage Auction Mechanism for Long-Term Participation in Crowdsourcing
Timothy Shin Heng Mak, Albert Y.S. Lam

TL;DR
This paper introduces a two-stage auction mechanism for crowdsourcing that encourages long-term participation by balancing cost efficiency and fairness, extending optimal auction theory to more complex worker bids.
Contribution
It extends Myerson's auction to multi-parameter bids and proposes a flexible work allocation mechanism to improve diversity and long-term engagement.
Findings
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility achieved for complex bids
Work allocation balances cost and fairness effectively
Validated through analytical proofs and simulations
Abstract
Crowdsourcing has become an important tool to collect data for various artificial intelligence applications and auction can be an effective way to allocate work and determine reward in a crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we focus on the crowdsourcing of small tasks such as image labelling and voice recording where we face a number of challenges. First, workers have different limits on the amount of work they would be willing to do, and they may also misreport these limits in their bid for work. Secondly, if the auction is repeated over time, unsuccessful workers may drop out of the system, reducing competition and diversity. To tackle these issues, we first extend the results of the celebrated Myerson's optimal auction mechanism for a single-parameter bid to the case where the bid consists of the unit cost of work, the maximum amount of work one is willing to do, and the actual…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Mobile Crowdsensing and Crowdsourcing · Supply Chain and Inventory Management
