Improved Security Proof for the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signature-Based Synchronized Aggregate Signature Scheme
Masayuki Tezuka, Keisuke Tanaka

TL;DR
This paper presents an improved security proof for a bilinear group-based synchronized aggregate signature scheme, replacing the previous one-time assumption with a static assumption, enhancing confidence and efficiency.
Contribution
The authors provide a new security proof for the synchronized aggregate signature scheme under a static assumption, reducing reliance on less practical one-time assumptions.
Findings
Security proof now based on 1-MSDH-2 assumption
Maintains efficiency while strengthening security guarantees
Replaces one-time assumption with static assumption
Abstract
The Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme in CRYPTO 2004 is a useful building block to construct privacy-preserving schemes such as anonymous credentials, group signatures or ring signatures. However, the security of this signature scheme relies on the interactive assumption called the LRSW assumption. Even if the interactive assumptions are proven in the generic group model or bilinear group model, the concerns about these assumptions arise in a cryptographic community. This fact caused a barrier to the use of cryptographic schemes whose security relies on these assumptions. Recently, Pointcheval and Sanders proposed the modified Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme in CT-RSA 2018. This scheme satisfies the EUF-CMA security under the new q-type assumption called the Modified-q-Strong Diffie-Hellman-2 (q-MSDH-2) assumption. However, the size of a q- type assumptions grows dynamically…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs
