Game Theoretic Models for Profit-Sharing in Multi-fleet Platoons

TL;DR

This paper models profit-sharing in multi-fleet platoons using game theory, analyzing how competing transportation companies can collaborate by sharing profits to optimize platooning strategies.

Contribution

It introduces new profit distribution models for vehicles from competing companies and analyzes their strategic interactions using game theory and Nash equilibria.

Findings

Different profit distribution models lead to varying equilibrium outcomes.

Game-theoretic analysis reveals stable strategies for platoon formation.

Numerical evaluation compares effectiveness of distribution models.

Abstract

Profit-sharing is needed within platoons in order for competing transportation companies to collaborate in forming platoons. In this paper, we propose distribution models of the profit designed for vehicles that are located at the same origin and are operated by competing transportation companies. The vehicles have default departure times, but can decide to depart at other times in order to benefit from platooning. We model the strategic interaction among vehicles with game theory and consider pure Nash equilibria as the solution concept. In a numerical evaluation we compare the outcomes of the games associated with different distribution models of the profit.