Preference Learning in School Choice Problems

TL;DR

This paper analyzes how the Deferred-Acceptance mechanism in school choice affects students' information gathering and report homogeneity, highlighting the importance of accessible information for efficiency.

Contribution

It introduces a model showing how information costs influence student reports and outcomes under the DA mechanism, emphasizing the role of information accessibility.

Findings

Greater homogeneity in rank-order reports under DA

Reduced information acquisition with DA mechanism

Increased reliance on random tie-breaking and inefficiency

Abstract

In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We study a school choice model where students can obtain information about their preferences by incurring a cost. We demonstrate greater homogeneity in rank-order reports and reduced information acquisition under the Deferred-Acceptance (DA) mechanism, resulting in an increased reliance on random tie-breaking and ultimately inefficient outcomes. Thus, it is critical for the DA mechanism to have easy access to school information in order to maintain its efficiency.