Code-routing: a new attack on position verification
Joy Cree, Alex May

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new quantum attack on position verification schemes based on $f$-routing, exploiting secret-sharing encoding to efficiently compromise schemes for functions in the class $ ext{Mod}_p ext{L}$, surpassing previous methods.
Contribution
It presents a novel cheating strategy using secret-sharing encoding that attacks $f$-routing schemes for a broader class of functions than prior approaches.
Findings
The new attack completes $f$-routing with $O(SP_p(f))$ EPR pairs.
Efficient attack possible for functions in $ ext{Mod}_p ext{L}$ class.
Quantum secret sharing size bounds entanglement cost for $f$-routing.
Abstract
The cryptographic task of position verification attempts to verify one party's location in spacetime by exploiting constraints on quantum information and relativistic causality. A popular verification scheme known as -routing involves requiring the prover to redirect a quantum system based on the value of a Boolean function . Cheating strategies for the -routing scheme require the prover use pre-shared entanglement, and security of the scheme rests on assumptions about how much entanglement a prover can manipulate. Here, we give a new cheating strategy in which the quantum system is encoded into a secret-sharing scheme, and the authorization structure of the secret-sharing scheme is exploited to direct the system appropriately. This strategy completes the -routing task using EPR pairs, where is the minimal size of a span program over the field…
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Taxonomy
TopicsQuantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture · Cryptography and Data Security · Quantum Information and Cryptography
