Eternalism and the Problem of Hyperplanes
Matias Slavov

TL;DR
The paper critically examines the argument for eternalism based on hyperplanes of simultaneity, highlighting issues with conventionality and proposing alternative strategies that do not rely on hyperplanes.
Contribution
It challenges the traditional hyperplane-based argument for eternalism and introduces alternative approaches that avoid reliance on hyperplanes of simultaneity.
Findings
Hyperplane-based arguments for eternalism are undermined by the conventionality of simultaneity.
Alternative eternalist strategies that do not depend on hyperplanes are proposed.
There are compelling reasons to favor eternalism over presentism despite the lack of a rigorous proof.
Abstract
Eternalism is the view that the past, the present and the future exist simpliciter. A typical argument in favor of this view leans on the relativity of simultaneity. The 'equally real with' relation is assumed to be transitive between spacelike separated events connected by hyperplanes of simultaneity. This reasoning is in tension with the conventionality of simultaneity. Conventionality indicates that, even within a specific frame, simultaneity is based on the choice of the synchronization parameter. Hence the argument for eternalism is compromised. This paper lays out alternative eternalist strategies which do not hinge on hyperplanes. While we lack a rigorous proof for eternalism, there are still cogent reasons to prefer eternalism over presentism.
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