Strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preferences
P\'eter Bir\'o, Gergely Cs\'aji

TL;DR
This paper investigates the computational complexity of strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-partner matching problems with lexicographic preferences, providing both hardness results and efficient algorithms for approximate solutions.
Contribution
It establishes NP-hardness and co-NP-completeness results for core and Pareto-optimality, and introduces polynomial algorithms for near-feasible solutions and maximum Pareto-optimal matchings.
Findings
Strong core can be empty even under severe restrictions.
Deciding non-emptiness of the strong core is NP-hard.
Efficient algorithms exist for near-feasible strong core solutions and maximum Pareto-optimal matchings.
Abstract
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under lexicographic preferences. We study strong core and Pareto-optimal solutions for this setting from a computational point of view. First we provide an example to show that the strong core can be empty even under these severe restrictions for many-to-many problems, and that deciding the non-emptiness of the strong core is NP-hard. We also show that for a given matching checking Pareto-optimality and the strong core properties are co-NP-complete problems for the many-to-many problem, and deciding the existence of a complete Pareto-optimal matching is also NP-hard for the fixtures problem. On the positive side, we give efficient algorithms for finding a near…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems
