No-Regret Learning in Dynamic Stackelberg Games
Niklas Lauffer, Mahsa Ghasemi, Abolfazl Hashemi, Yagiz Savas, and Ufuk, Topcu

TL;DR
This paper introduces a no-regret learning algorithm for dynamic Stackelberg games with unknown follower utilities, achieving sublinear regret and outperforming existing reinforcement learning methods.
Contribution
It develops a novel no-regret learning algorithm for dynamic Stackelberg games with unknown, linearly parameterized follower utilities, independent of state space size.
Findings
Achieves sublinear regret bounds in dynamic Stackelberg games.
Regret is independent of the state space size.
Outperforms existing model-free reinforcement learning approaches.
Abstract
In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an underlying state space that affects the leader's rewards and available strategies and evolves in a Markovian manner depending on both the leader and follower's selected strategies. Although standard Stackelberg games have been utilized to improve scheduling in security domains, their deployment is often limited by requiring complete information of the follower's utility function. In contrast, we consider scenarios where the follower's utility function is unknown to the leader; however, it can be linearly parameterized. Our objective then is to provide an algorithm that prescribes a randomized strategy to the leader at each step of the game based on…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInfrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis · Age of Information Optimization · Game Theory and Applications
