Allocation of Indivisible Items with Individual Preference Graphs
Nina Chiarelli, Cl\'ement Dallard, Andreas Darmann, Stefan Lendl,, Martin Milani\v{c}, Peter Mur\v{s}i\v{c}, Ulrich Pferschy, Nevena Piva\v{c}

TL;DR
This paper explores the allocation of indivisible items based on agents' preference graphs, introducing a dissatisfaction measure and analyzing the computational complexity of minimizing dissatisfaction in various graph structures.
Contribution
It introduces a new dissatisfaction measure for indivisible item allocation based on preference graphs and studies the complexity of minimizing dissatisfaction.
Findings
NP-hardness results for general cases
Polynomial algorithms for specific graph structures
Parameterized complexity analysis with respect to various parameters
Abstract
This paper studies the allocation of indivisible items to agents, when each agent's preferences are expressed by means of a directed acyclic graph. The vertices of each preference graph represent the subset of items approved of by the respective agent. An arc in such a graph means that the respective agent prefers item over item . We introduce a new measure of dissatisfaction of an agent by counting the number of non-assigned items which are approved of by the agent and for which no more preferred item is allocated to the agent. Considering two problem variants, we seek an allocation of the items to the agents in a way that minimizes (i) the total dissatisfaction over all agents or (ii) the maximum dissatisfaction among the agents. For both optimization problems we study the status of computational complexity and obtain NP-hardness results as well as polynomial algorithms…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Graph Theory Research · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Game Theory and Voting Systems
