TL;DR
This paper introduces a novel digital currency protocol that combines asynchronous broadcast efficiency with on-demand consensus, enabling smart contracts and conflict resolution while maintaining optimal Byzantine fault tolerance.
Contribution
It presents a new protocol that selectively performs consensus only when necessary, bridging the gap between no-consensus and traditional consensus systems.
Findings
Protocol supports smart contracts and conflict resolution.
Achieves optimal Byzantine fault tolerance with less than one-fifth malicious participants.
Formal proof of correctness and open-source implementation provided.
Abstract
Digital money can be implemented efficiently by avoiding consensus. However, no-consensus implementations have drawbacks, as they cannot support smart contracts, and (even more fundamentally) they cannot deal with conflicting transactions. We present a novel protocol that combines the benefits of an asynchronous, broadcast-based digital currency, with the capacity to perform consensus. This is achieved by selectively performing consensus a posteriori, i.e., only when absolutely necessary. Our on-demand consensus comes at the price of restricting the Byzantine participants to be less than a one-fifth minority in the system, which is the optimal threshold. We formally prove the correctness of our system and present an open-source implementation, which inherits many features from the Ethereum ecosystem.
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