Local majority-with-inertia rule can explain global consensus dynamics in a network coordination game

TL;DR

This paper investigates how local majority-with-inertia decision rules influence the speed and pattern of consensus formation in networked groups, highlighting the roles of network structure, individual incentives, and opinion dynamics.

Contribution

It introduces a local majority-with-inertia rule model that explains how individual decision-making processes affect global consensus in network coordination games.

Findings

More links in networks speed up consensus unless conflicting opinions are present.

Opinionated individuals tend to stick to their preferences unless peer pressure is high.

The proposed rules can produce rapid consensus and prevent deadlocks in group decision-making.

Abstract

We study how groups reach consensus by varying communication network structure and individual incentives. In 342 networks of seven individuals, single opinionated "leaders" can drive decision outcomes, but do not accelerate consensus formation, whereas conflicting opinions slow consensus. While networks with more links reach consensus faster, this advantage disappears under conflict. Unopinionated individuals make choices consistent with a local majority rule combined with "inertia" favouring their previous choice, while opinionated individuals favour their preferred option but yield under high peer or time pressure. Simulations show these individual rules can account for group patterns, and allow rapid consensus while preventing deadlocks.