Cyber-resilience for marine navigation by information fusion and change detection

TL;DR

This paper enhances marine navigation cyber-resilience by integrating sensor fusion, change detection, and diagnosis techniques to identify and mitigate sensor spoofing and faults in real-time.

Contribution

It introduces a novel two-stage estimator and a high-level data consistency evaluation approach for detecting and isolating sensor compromises in marine navigation.

Findings

Successfully diagnosed sensor spoofing in sea tests

Demonstrated effective change detection under simulated attacks

Proposed a technology-agnostic data evaluation method

Abstract

Cyber-resilience is an increasing concern in developing autonomous navigation solutions for marine vessels. This paper scrutinizes cyber-resilience properties of marine navigation through a prism with three edges: multiple sensor information fusion, diagnosis of not-normal behaviours, and change detection. It proposes a two-stage estimator for diagnosis and mitigation of sensor signals used for coastal navigation. Developing a Likelihood Field approach, a first stage extracts shoreline features from radar and matches them to the electronic navigation chart. A second stage associates buoy and beacon features from the radar with chart information. Using real data logged at sea tests combined with simulated spoofing, the paper verifies the ability to timely diagnose and isolate an attempt to compromise position measurements. A new approach is suggested for high level processing of received data to evaluate their consistency, that is agnostic to the underlying technology of the individual sensory input. A combined parametric Gaussian modelling and Kernel Density Estimation is suggested and compared with a generalized likelihood ratio change detector that uses sliding windows. The paper shows how deviations from nominal behaviour and isolation of the components is possible when under attack or when defects in sensors occur.